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9
10 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
11 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
12 **WESTERN DIVISION**

13 MICHAEL J. BUTALA, Individually
14 and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
15 Situated,

16 Plaintiff,

17 v.

18 OWLET, INC. f/k/a SANDBRIDGE
19 ACQUISITION CORPORATION,
20 KURT WORKMAN, KATE
21 SCOLNICK, KEN SUSLOW,
22 RICHARD HENRY,
23 DOMENICO DE SOLE, RAMEZ
24 TOUBASSY, JAMIE WEINSTEIN,
25 KRYSTAL KAHLER, and MICHAEL
26 F. GOSS,

27 Defendants.

Case No.: 2:21-cv-09016-FLA-JEM

Honorable Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha

**PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN SUPPORT OF
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR
FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT**

Hearing Date: February 6, 2026

Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.

Location: Courtroom 6B

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1 **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

2 Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of all Settlement Class Members¹,
3 respectfully submit this memorandum of law in support of their unopposed motion
4 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), seeking final approval of a \$1.75 million non-
5 reversionary cash settlement (the “Settlement”) that recovers 19.4% of estimated
6 maximum recoverable damages (or over 100% of maximum recoverable damages
7 under the Defendants’ Damages Theory, defined *infra*). This is an excellent result for
8 the Settlement Class in light of the significant risks inherent in this complex securities
9 class action litigation.

10 The Settlement is the product of Lead Counsel’s extensive investigation
11 concerning the claims asserted in the Action and vigorous prosecution of the litigation
12 on behalf of the Settlement Class. Lead Counsel: (i) conducted an extensive
13 investigation of the alleged wrongdoing; (ii) drafted the Amended Consolidated
14 Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws (“AC”), ECF No. 80; (iii)
15 survived the Owlet Defendants’ motion to dismiss despite the PSLRA’s heightened
16 pleading standard and automatic stay of discovery; (iv) pursued fact discovery; (v)
17 conducted extensive consultations with experts to evaluate potential damages; (vi)
18 drafted a detailed mediation statement, addressing liability and damages; (vii)

19 _____
20 ¹ All capitalized terms, unless otherwise defined herein, have the same meaning as set
21 forth in the Stipulation of Settlement dated January 31, 2025 (the “Stipulation” or
22 “Stip.”), ECF No. 144-2. Internal citations and quotations are omitted and emphasis
23 is added unless otherwise noted. Citations to the “Weinrib Decl.” are to the
24 Declaration of Tamar A. Weinrib in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motions For: (1) Final
25 Approval of Class Action Settlement; and (2) Attorneys’ Fees, Reimbursement of
26 Expenses, and Compensatory Awards to Plaintiffs, filed herewith. Citations to the
27 “Craig Decl.” are to the Declaration of Margery Craig Concerning: (A)
28 Mailing/Emailing of the Postcard Notice; (B) Publication of the Summary Notice; and
29 (C) Report on Requests for Exclusion and Objections, attached as Exhibit 1 to the
30 Weinrib Decl. Citations to the “Fee Brief” are to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in
31 Support of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and
32 Compensatory Awards to Plaintiffs, filed herewith.

1 participated in a formal full day in-person mediation session before Mr. Murphy to
2 obtain a favorable settlement for Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class; (viii) engaged in
3 negotiations regarding the terms of the proposed Settlement; and (ix) worked with a
4 financial damages expert to craft a plan of allocation that treats Plaintiffs and all other
5 Settlement Class Members fairly.

6 While Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel believe that Plaintiffs' claims are
7 meritorious, they recognize the substantial challenges to establishing liability, proving
8 damages, and achieving (and collecting upon) a greater recovery. Defendants have
9 and would continue to contest each element of Plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, discovery
10 would have been time-consuming and expensive.

11 The Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under the governing standards
12 in this Circuit. The \$1,750,000 Settlement falls well within the range of settlements
13 in comparable securities fraud cases and eliminates the significant costs and risks of
14 continuing litigation through summary judgment, trial and the inevitable appeals.
15 Additionally, as of the date of this filing, no Settlement Class Members have objected
16 to any aspect of the Settlement nor have any Settlement Class Members requested
17 exclusion from the settlement. Likewise, the proposed Plan of Allocation is eminently
18 fair and reasonable, as it equitably allocates the Net Settlement Fund to those
19 Settlement Class Members who submit valid claims.

20 For these reasons, and those set forth below, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that
21 the Settlement and Plan of Allocation are in the best interests of the Settlement Class
22 and merit final approval. Additionally, the Court should grant final certification of the
23 proposed Settlement Class for settlement purposes only.

24 **II. BACKGROUND**

25 **A. Nature of the Action and Procedural History**

26 This Action was commenced on November 17, 2021, asserting claims on behalf
27 of a putative class of investors pursuant to §§14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities
28

1 Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) against Defendants Owlet, Inc. f/k/a Sandbridge
2 Acquisition Corporation, Kurt Workman, and Kate Scolnick (collectively, “Owlet
3 Defendants”), Defendants Ken Suslow, Richard Henry, Domenico De Sole, Ramez
4 Toubassy, Jamie Weinstein, Krystal Kahler, and Michael F. Goss (collectively,
5 “Sandbridge Defendants,” and together with the Owlet Defendants, “Defendants”).
6 ECF No. 1.

7 On September 8, 2023, the Court appointed Lead Plaintiff for the Section 14(a)
8 claim and approved Pomerantz LLP as Lead Counsel. ECF No. 63. Thereafter, Lead
9 Counsel conducted a comprehensive investigation into Defendants’ allegedly
10 wrongful acts, which included, among other things: (i) reviewing and analyzing (a)
11 Sandbridge and Owlet’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
12 (“SEC”), (b) public reports, press releases, blog posts, and news articles concerning
13 Sandbridge and Owlet, (c) Sandbridge and Owlet investor call transcripts; (ii) the
14 retention of a private investigator; and (iii) consultation with experts. Based on the
15 foregoing investigation, Lead Plaintiff filed the Amended Consolidated Complaint for
16 Violations of the Federal Securities Laws (“AC”) on December 22, 2023 against
17 Defendants. ECF No. 80.

18 The AC alleges that Defendants negligently disseminated a Proxy Statement to
19 solicit shareholder approval of the de-SPAC merger between Owlet Baby Care Inc.
20 and Sandbridge Acquisition Corporation wherein they falsely stated that their flagship
21 product, the Smart Sock, was not a medical device for which they needed FDA
22 authorization, that it was only possible rather than certain that the FDA would
23 conclude that the Smart Sock was a medical device requiring authorization, that Owlet
24 complied with all relevant FDA regulations, and that Owlet could achieve over a
25 billion dollars in revenue by 2025 based on the premise that it could continue selling
26 the Smart Sock unimpeded without FDA authorization.

1 On February 9, 2024, the Owlet Defendants and Sandbridge Defendants
2 separately moved to dismiss the AC. ECF Nos. 92, 94, 95. Lead Plaintiff filed briefs
3 in opposition on March 22, 2024, ECF Nos. 109, 111, and on May 10, 2024,
4 Defendants filed their replies, ECF Nos. 117, 120.

5 On August 5, 2024, the Court denied the Owlet Defendants' motion to dismiss
6 in its entirety, ruling that the AC adequately alleges that they negligently disseminated
7 the Proxy with false and misleading statements given that the FDA had unequivocally
8 communicated to Owlet since 2016 that the Smart Sock is a medical device. ECF No.
9 124. The Court granted the Sandbridge Defendants' motion to dismiss. *Id.*

10 On August 19, 2024, the Owlet Defendants filed their answers and affirmative
11 defenses to the AC, ECF No. 125. Thereafter, discovery commenced. On September
12 20, 2024, the Parties filed a Joint Rule 26(f) Discovery Plan. ECF No. 135. Both
13 Parties served discovery requests and both Parties served responses and objections
14 thereto.

15 **B. The Settlement**

16 On November 25, 2024, the Parties voluntarily participated in a full-day
17 mediation session before David M. Murphy, esq. of PADRE. Though the mediation
18 did not result in settlement, thereafter the Parties agreed to a mediator's
19 recommendation and negotiated the terms of the settlement. Defendants deny the
20 allegations asserted in the AC and the Settlement is entered into by Defendants
21 without any admission of wrongdoing. On December 27, 2024, the Parties notified
22 the Court that they had reached an agreement to settle the claims in the AC. ECF No.
23 142. On January 6, 2025, the Court entered an Order vacating the case deadlines and
24 setting a January 31, 2025 deadline for Plaintiffs to file a Motion for Preliminary
25 Approval of the settlement. ECF No. 143.

1 On January 31, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
2 Approval of Class Action Settlement, together with supporting papers, including a
3 fully executed copy of the Stipulation and all exhibits thereto. ECF Nos. 144, 144-2.

4 On September 15, 2025, the Court entered an order granting preliminary
5 approval of the Settlement, provisionally certifying the Settlement Class for purposes
6 of the Settlement and authorizing the form and manner of providing notice of the
7 Settlement to potential Settlement Class members (“Preliminary Approval Order”).
8 ECF No. 153.

9 Pursuant to the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order, 47,605 notices were
10 disseminated to potential Settlement Class Members and nominees. *See* Craig Decl.,
11 ¶¶ 5-9. To date, no Settlement Class Members have objected to the settlement nor
12 have any Settlement Class Members opted out. Craig Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. The deadline to
13 seek exclusion from the Settlement or to object to the Settlement is January 16, 2026.
14 *Id.*

15 For these reasons and those set forth below, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that
16 the Court should approve the Settlement because it is fair, reasonable and adequate.

17 **III. LEGAL STANDARD**

18 The Ninth Circuit has a “strong judicial policy that favors settlements,
19 particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned.” *In re Syncor ERISA*
20 *Litig.*, 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008); *see also Mandalevy v. BofI Holding, Inc.*,
21 2022 WL 4474263, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2022). When parties settle a putative
22 class action before a class is formally certified, the Court must assess if (1) the
23 proposed settlement class meets all requirements for class certification; and (2) the
24 settlement satisfies all requirements of Rule 23(e). *Staton v. Boeing Co.*, 327 F.3d
25 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). As explained below, there is ample support for both here.

26 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED AS A CLASS**

27 As provided in the Stipulation, to implement the terms of the Settlement,
28

1 Plaintiff seek certification of a Settlement Class consists of all Persons that held
2 Sandbridge Acquisition Corporation (“Sandbridge”) common stock as of June 1,
3 2021 and were eligible to vote at Sandbridge’s special meeting on July 14, 2021.
4 Stip. ¶ 1.40. Excluded from the Settlement Class are:

- 5 (i) Defendants; (ii) current and former officers and directors of the
6 Company; (iii) members of the immediate family of each of the
7 Individual Defendants; (iv) all subsidiaries and affiliates of the
8 Company and the directors and officers of such subsidiaries or
9 affiliates; (v) all persons, firms, trusts, corporations, officers, directors,
10 and any other individual or entity in which any of the Defendants have
11 a controlling interest; (vi) the legal representatives, agents, affiliates,
12 heirs, successors-in-interest or assigns of all such excluded parties; and
13 (vii) any persons or entities who properly exclude themselves by filing
14 a valid and timely request for exclusion.

15 *Id.* All requirements are satisfied to maintain the Settlement Class for purposes of the
16 Settlement.

17 Courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely certify class actions alleging securities
18 fraud for settlement purposes. *See In re Mullen Auto., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2025 WL
19 2054253, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2025) (certifying settlement class for final
20 approval of the settlement); *see also Schneider v. Champignon Brands Inc.*, 2023
21 WL 11944374, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2023) (same). Certification of a settlement
22 class is appropriate where, as here, the proposed class and class representatives meet
23 the four requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
24 adequacy. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); ECF No. 144 at 14-18 (Preliminary Settlement
25 Approval Brief).

26 Moreover, class certification is warranted where common questions of law or
27 fact predominate over any individual question and a class action is superior to other
28 available means of adjudication. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); *see also Amchem Prods.,*
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 607 (1997). This standard is easily met here, as it is
in most securities class actions. The root of the Action – whether Defendants made

1 public misrepresentations of material facts in the Proxy Statement to solicit
2 shareholder approval of the de-SPAC merger– is the central issue and predominates
3 over any theoretical individual issue that may arise. The common resolution of these
4 issues supports a finding of predominance. *Middlesex Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Semtech*
5 *Corp.*, 2010 WL 11507255, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010); *In re Cooper Cos. Sec.*
6 *Litig.*, 254 F.R.D. 628, 632 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“The common questions of whether
7 misrepresentations were made and whether Defendants had the requisite scienter
8 predominate over any individual questions of reliance and damages.”).

9 In the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court provisionally found that the
10 requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) were satisfied. ECF No. 153, ¶¶2-3.
11 “Nothing has changed since the conditional certification, and likewise, there is no
12 basis to revisit the court's order and analysis.” *Sypherd v. Lazy Dog Rests., LLC*, 2023
13 WL 1931319, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2023) (Aenlle-Rocha, J.). *See Mandalevy*,
14 2022 WL 4474263, at *3 (granting final certification of settlement class when “no
15 material changes have occurred since this Court’s preliminary approval” order).

16 **V. THE SETTLEMENT WARRANTS FINAL APPROVAL**

17 Rule 23(e) requires judicial approval of any compromise to settle claims in a
18 class action. The Court may do so only upon a finding, after holding a hearing, that
19 the compromise is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The
20 decision to approve a proposed class action settlement rests in the sound discretion
21 of the district court, *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1025 (9th Cir. 1998),
22 *overruled on other grounds, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338 (2011),
23 and must be “made in the context of a ‘strong judicial policy’” that favors the
24 settlement of class actions, *In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2022 WL 9497235, at
25 *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2022) (quoting *Syncor ERISA Litig.*, 516 F.3d at 1101); *see*
26 *also In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2008)

1 (“[T]he court must also be mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s policy favoring settlement
2 . . . in class action lawsuits.”).

3 Rule 23(e)(2) was amended in 2018 to create uniformity among federal courts
4 on the primary considerations they must weigh to determine if a proposed class action
5 settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), advisory
6 committee notes (2018 amendments). As amended, Rule 23(e)(2) directs courts to
7 consider whether:

8 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately
9 represented the class;

10 (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;

11 (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:

12 (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

13 (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief
14 to the class, including the method of processing class-member
15 claims;

16 (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including
17 timing of payment; and

18 (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3);
19 and

20 (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The first two factors focus on “procedural” concerns,
22 whereas the final two focus on the “substantive” terms of the settlement. Fed. R. Civ.
23 P. 23(e)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendments. These points of inquiry
24 overlap with the *Hanlon* factors that traditionally guided the fairness analysis:

25 [T]he strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and
26 likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action
27 status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent
28 of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience

1 and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and
2 the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

3 *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026. The 2018 amendments to Rule 23(e) make clear that the
4 considerations identified therein were not designed to “displace” any factor
5 previously used by courts to evaluate settlements, but rather to “focus the court and
6 the lawyers on the core concerns of procedure and substance that should guide the
7 decision whether to approve the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory
8 committee’s note to 2018 amendments. Thus, courts may still consider additional
9 *Hanlon* factors in the exercise of discretion. *See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pollard*, 2024
10 WL 4596401, at *5-8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2024). Ultimately, “[a] settlement should
11 be approved if it is fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.” *Torrisi v. Tucson*
12 *Elec. Power Co.*, 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993); *see also In re Mego Fin. Corp.*
13 *Sec. Litig.*, 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000) (similar).

14 Given the above, Plaintiffs will address the fairness, reasonableness, and
15 adequacy of the Settlement principally in relation to the factors set forth in Rule
16 23(e)(2) but will also address the application of relevant, non-duplicative *Hanlon*
17 factors as well. As detailed below, each of these factors strongly supports final
18 approval of the Settlement.

19 **A. The Settlement Satisfies the Standard for Judicial Approval**

20 **1. Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel Adequately Represented the**
21 **Class**

22 The first Rule 23(e)(2) consideration is whether “the class representatives and
23 class counsel have adequately represented the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A). As
24 this Court has recognized, this analysis is “redundant of the requirements of Rule
25 23(a)(4),” *Mandalevy*, 2022 WL 4474263, at * 6 (quoting 4 William B. Rubenstein,
26 *Newberg on Class Actions* § 13:48 (5th ed. 2020)), which asks “(1) do the named
27 plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members
28 and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on

1 behalf of the class?” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1020; *see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale*
2 *Corp.*, 657 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 2011) (same).

3 Rule 23(e)(2)(A) is satisfied for the same reasons that Rule 23(a)(4) is satisfied.
4 As holders of Sandbridge common stock as of June 1, 2021 that were eligible to vote
5 at Sandbridge’s special meeting on July 14, 2021, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of
6 those of the Settlement Class; their interests are thus fully aligned with the Settlement
7 Class to maximize the potential recovery. *See Davis v. Yelp, Inc.*, 2022 WL 21748777,
8 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2022) (party with claims that are “typical” with absent class
9 members shares “interest in obtaining the largest possible recovery in this Action”).
10 Similarly, by working on a contingency basis, “Plaintiff’s counsel has incentive to
11 litigate for the best possible recovery for the entire proposed Settlement Class.” *In re*
12 *Wireless Facilities, Inc. Sec. Litig. II*, 253 F.R.D. 607, 612 (S.D. Cal. 2008). As such,
13 Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel have aggressively and skillfully prosecuted the claims
14 asserted and engaged in extensive settlement negotiations, zealously pushing for the
15 greatest recovery possible. Lead Counsel has expended considerable time, effort, and
16 resources pursuing a favorable recovery, which efforts have included (i) conducted
17 an extensive investigation of the alleged wrongdoing; (ii) drafted the Amended
18 Consolidated Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws (“AC”), ECF
19 No. 80; (iii) survived the Owlet Defendants’ motion to dismiss despite the PSLRA’s
20 heightened pleading standard and automatic stay of discovery; (iv) pursued fact
21 discovery; (v) conducted extensive consultations with experts to evaluate potential
22 damages; (vi) drafted a detailed mediation statement, addressing liability and
23 damages; (vii) participated in a formal full day in-person mediation session before
24 Mr. Murphy to obtain a favorable settlement for Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class;
25 (viii) engaged in negotiations regarding the terms of the proposed Settlement; and (ix)
26 worked with a financial damages expert to craft a plan of allocation that treats
27 Plaintiffs and all other Settlement Class Members fairly. *See Weinrib Decl.* ¶¶ 36, 46.

28

1 Plaintiffs oversaw and assisted with the prosecution of the claim, and Lead Plaintiff
2 answered extensive discovery propounded upon him by Defendants. *Id.* ¶¶ 67-69,
3 Exs. 3-4. These facts strongly indicate that Plaintiffs will continue to vigorously
4 prosecute the Action for the benefit of the Settlement Class.

5 **2. The Settlement Is the Product of Arm’s-Length** 6 **Negotiations**

7 Rule 23(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to consider whether “the proposal was
8 negotiated at arm’s length.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(B). Courts in the Ninth Circuit
9 “put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length, non-collusive, negotiated
10 resolution.” *Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009). As a
11 result, settlements that result from non-collusive, procedurally fair negotiations are
12 presumed fair. *See Wireless Facilities*, 253 F.R.D. at 610.

13 Here, the Parties participated in a full-day mediation session with Mr. Murphy,
14 which did not result in a settlement. Weinrib Decl., at 17. Following the mediation,
15 Mr. Murphy made a proposal to settle the action for \$1.75 million, which all Parties
16 ultimately accepted. *Id.* The arm’s length nature of the extensive settlement
17 negotiations and the involvement of a mediator with substantial experience mediating
18 securities class actions support the conclusion that the Settlement is fair and was
19 achieved free of collusion. *In re QuantumScape Sec. Litig.*, 2024 WL 3491039, at *1,
20 *10 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2024) (preliminarily approving settlement achieved with the
21 assistance of Mr. Murphy); *In re Lyft Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2022 WL 17740302, at *1, *4,
22 *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2022) (same); *see also In re Illumina, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2021
23 WL 1017295, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2021) (settlement reached after a “full day”
24 mediation “with the mediator’s assistance” supporting finding the settlement was the
25 product of arm’s-length negotiations for purposes of final approval).

26 To be sure, the Settlement does not display any of the usual hallmarks of a
27 collusive agreement. *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 947
28 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, the total cash recovery of \$1.75 million was put into an interest-

1 bearing escrow account, from which Lead Counsel is seeking an award of fees and
2 expenses. The Settlement does not include a clear sailing provision, and any
3 remaining funds in the Settlement fund are to be distributed to Settlement Class
4 Members without revision to Defendants. *See BofI Holding*, 2022 WL 9497235, at *5
5 (no hallmarks of collusion when settlement was “non-reversionary”); *Moreno v.*
6 *Beacon Roofing Supply, Inc.*, 2020 WL 3960481, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2020)
7 (Curiel, J.) (same when “no money will revert back to Defendant”). In addition, as
8 explained more fully *infra*, the Plan of Allocation treats all Settlement Class members
9 the same based on their proportionate losses.

10 Notably, the Settlement was the result of *counseled* negotiation. The
11 endorsement of experienced counsel is yet another factor that “weigh[s] in favor of
12 approval.” *BofI Holding*, 2022 WL 9497235, at *5; *see also Ali v. Franklin Wireless*
13 *Corp.*, 2024 WL 5179910, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2024) (entry into settlement by
14 parties represented by “experienced counsel” is accorded “a great deal of weight”).
15 This makes sense; counsel—especially counsel with relevant subject matter
16 experience—is “most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation.”
17 *Mandalevy*, 2022 WL 4474263, at *7; *see also In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig.*, 47 F.3d
18 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Parties represented by competent counsel are better
19 positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s
20 expected outcome in litigation.”). Counsel for the Parties are experienced and
21 sophisticated litigators who specialize in securities class actions of this type, and
22 forcefully advocated on their clients’ behalf. *See In re ImmunityBio, Inc. Sec. Litig.*,
23 2025 WL 1686263, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 16, 2025) (“Pomerantz ... are experienced
24 securities litigators who have litigated numerous securities class actions on behalf of
25 stakeholders in district courts throughout the country.”); *In re Cheetah Mobile, Inc.*
26 *Sec. Litig.*, 2021 WL 99635, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2021) (“Pomerantz [has]
27 extensive experience prosecuting complex securities class actions such as this one,
28

1 and are well qualified to represent the putative Class.”); *In re Petrobras Sec. Litig.*,
2 312 F.R.D. 354, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Pomerantz is “qualified, experienced and able
3 to conduct the litigation”), *aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds*, 862 F.3d
4 250 (2d Cir. 2017). Their independent judgement that the Settlement is a fair and
5 advantageous result provides further evidence that the Settlement warrants final
6 approval.

7 **3. The Settlement Affords Substantial Relief**

8 The determination of what constitutes a “reasonable” settlement is not
9 susceptible to a mathematical formula. Because “[s]ettlement is the offspring of
10 compromise[,] the question . . . is not whether the final product could be prettier,
11 smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion.” *Hanlon*,
12 150 F.3d at 1027. “Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a
13 compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties
14 each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with litigation.”
15 *Officers for Justice v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982). Under
16 Rule 23(e)(2)(C), the Court must consider whether “the relief provided for the class
17 is adequate,” taking into account four factors enumerated therein. Fed. R. Civ. P.
18 23(e)(2)(C). As discussed below, each of these factors supports a finding that this
19 recovery provides an excellent outcome for the Settlement Class under the
20 circumstances.

21 **The Relief Afforded by the Settlement.** The amount of a settlement “is
22 generally considered the most important, because the critical component of any
23 settlement is the amount of relief obtained by the class.” *Destefano v. Zynga, Inc.*,
24 2016 WL 537946, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016). Courts generally consider the
25 “expected recovery balanced against the value of the settlement offer.” *In re*
26 *Tableware Antitrust Litig.*, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
27 Importantly, a settlement need not compensate class members for the maximum
28

1 potential value of their claims and there is no fixed percentage of the potential
2 recovery that renders a settlement reasonable. Indeed, it has long been the law that
3 “a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery” may be
4 fair under the circumstances. *See Mego*, 213 F.3d at 459. As explained below,
5 considered in context, the Settlement represents an excellent recovery.

6 The Settlement here provides the Settlement Class with the certainty of \$1.75
7 million in cash. Plaintiffs’ damages expert estimates that if the Settlement Class fully
8 prevailed at trial, if the Court and jury accepted Plaintiffs’ damages theory, and the
9 jury verdict survived the inevitable appeals, the total maximum aggregate damages
10 would be approximately \$9 million (per share damages equal to the \$10 redemption
11 price minus the closing price following the corrective disclosure). Thus, the
12 Settlement Amount represents approximately 19.4% of the total maximum damages
13 potentially available in this Action. This recovery is well above the median recovery
14 of 1.8% in securities class actions settled in 2022, as well as the median recovery of
15 2.4% in securities class actions with damages of a similar magnitude.² However,
16 undoubtedly, even if Plaintiffs prevailed in full on liability, Defendants would have
17 argued that damages per share only equal the Company-specific decline in the price
18 of Owlet stock in response to the alleged corrective disclosure (“Defendants’
19 Damages Theory”). Under that theory, damages would equal approximately \$1.1
20 million, and the Settlement Amount would amount to more than **100% of damages**.
21 *See Baron v. HyreCar Inc.*, 2024 WL 3504234, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2024)
22 (settlement of approximately 2% of total damages is “in line with percentage
23

24 ² *See* Janeen McIntosh, Svetlana Starykh, and Edward Flores, Recent Trends in
25 Securities Class Action Litigation: 2022 Full-Year Review (NERA Jan. 24, 2023) at
26 18 (Fig. 19) (median recovery in securities class actions in 2022 was approximately
27 1.8% of estimated damages); *Id.* at 17 (Fig. 18) (median recovery in securities class
28 actions that settled between December 2011-December 2022 was 2.4% where
estimated damages were between \$200-399 million).

1 recoveries” in other securities class actions); *Farrar v. Workhorse Grp., Inc.*, 2023
2 WL 5505981, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2023) (collecting cases recognizing that
3 average recovery in securities class actions is between 2% to 3% of maximum
4 damages); *Kendall v. Odonate Therapeutics, Inc.*, 2022 WL 1997530, at *5 (S.D.
5 Cal. June 6, 2022) (settlement of 3.49% of maximum damages is “higher than the
6 2021 median recovery in securities class actions of 1.8%”).

7 **Cost, Risks, and Delay of Continued Litigation.** Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(i) requires
8 the Court to weigh the recovery provided by the Settlement against “the costs, risks,
9 and delay of trial and appeal.” In doing so, the Court “must balance the risks of
10 continued litigation, including the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff’s case,
11 against the benefits afforded to class members, including the immediacy and
12 certainty of recovery.” *Knapp v. Art.com, Inc.*, 283 F. Supp. 3d 823, 831 (N.D. Cal.
13 2017). Thus, the relief “must be judged ‘not in comparison with the possible recovery
14 in the best of all possible worlds, but rather in light of the strengths and weaknesses
15 of plaintiffs’ case’” if it continued. *In re Stable Rd. Acquisition Corp. Sec. Litig.*,
16 2024 WL 3643393, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2024) (quoting *Shapiro v. JPMorgan
17 Chase & Co.*, 2014 WL 1224666, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014)). All else being
18 equal, an immediate cash recovery is “preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation
19 with uncertain results,” unless the settlement amount is “clearly inadequate.” *Nat’l
20 Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

21 While the case has real strengths, there were myriad risks that continued
22 litigation would yield limited or no relief at all. For example, Plaintiffs and Lead
23 Counsel are confident that the Settlement Class meets the requirements for
24 certification but the class has not yet been certified, and Plaintiffs are aware that there
25 is a risk the Court could disagree. *See Espinosa v. Cal. Coll. of S.D., Inc.*, 2018 WL
26 1705955, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018) (the “risk that the Class would . . . not be
27 certified” favors approval of settlement when defendants planned to “vigorously
28

1 oppose” class certification if the case continued). Further, even if Lead Plaintiff
2 prevailed and secured class certification, there is “no guarantee the certification
3 would survive through trial,” as Defendants retain the right to decertify or modify
4 the class. *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1041. That Defendants could adduce new
5 evidence during the course of discovery to seek such relief further weighs in favor of
6 approving the settlement. *See In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S'holder Litig.*, 2014 WL
7 10212865, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014) (risk that “subsequent facts adduced
8 through discovery might have led to decertification . . . favors approval of the
9 settlement” and collecting cases); *see also Wireless Facilities*, 2008 WL 11338455,
10 at *5 (“The avoidance of risk of maintaining class action certification through[] trial
11 favors settlement of this action”); *In re Netflix Privacy Litig.*, 2013 WL 1120801, at
12 *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (“The notion that a district court could decertify a class
13 at any time is one that weighs in favor of settlement.”)

14 Similarly, Plaintiffs faced significant uncertainty establishing liability on the
15 merits at summary judgment and then trial. Indeed, this Court has already dismissed
16 the Action against the Sandbridge Defendants. Courts regularly recognize that
17 “securities litigation presents complex legal issues and problems of proof.” *Baron*,
18 2024 WL 3504234, at *8 (collecting cases). In order to prevail at summary judgment
19 and trial, Plaintiffs would have to prove, inter alia, that Defendants negligently
20 disseminated the Proxy with false and misleading statements, which Defendants have
21 vigorously disputed and would undoubtedly continue to dispute at summary
22 judgment and trial. For example, Defendants have argued that their statements that
23 the FDA may disagree with Owlet’s view that the Smart Sock is not a medical device
24 were not false or misleading given the nature of the FDA’s communications with
25 Owlet and because Defendants reasonably held the opinion that the Smart Sock
26 qualified as a wellness product. Further, even if Plaintiffs successfully proved
27 liability, Defendants would have asserted that Plaintiffs could only establish minimal
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1 damages. Specifically, the Owlet Defendants undoubtedly would have argued that
2 Plaintiffs could only claim the \$1.29 per share decline on October 4, 2021 following
3 revelation of the Warning Letter as damages, rather than the \$5.81 per share
4 difference in price between the option to redeem Sandbridge securities (\$10.00) and
5 the Owlet stock price following the disclosure of the Warning Letter (\$4.19).

6 Regardless of the ultimate outcome, there is no question that further litigation
7 would be exceptionally expensive and time-consuming. It is widely accepted that
8 “securities fraud class actions are notably complex, lengthy, and expensive cases to
9 litigate.” *Baker v. SeaWorld Ent., Inc.*, 2020 WL 4260712, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 24,
10 2020). Here, discovery costs would only escalate due to additional document
11 productions, disputes concerning the scope of discovery, the need for testimony from
12 an array of experts, and taking and defending numerous fact and expert depositions.
13 *See Farrar*, 2023 WL 5505981, at *7 (costs associated with “[n]umerous depositions
14 and document and other written discovery . . . if the case continued” favors approval).
15 Defendants disputed nearly every aspect of Plaintiffs’ claim, and there is no question
16 they would raise every available argument to avoid an adverse judgment if litigation
17 had continued. Thus, there would also be “significant costs and risks associated with
18 class certification, summary judgment, and trial.” *Baron*, 2024 WL 3504234, at *8.
19 And even if Lead Plaintiff prevailed at trial, Defendants would undoubtedly engage
20 in “vigorous post-trial motion practice . . . and likely appeals to the Ninth Circuit—
21 delaying any recovery for years.” *Baker*, 2020 WL 4260712, at *7; *see also Baron*,
22 2024 WL 3504234, at *8 (difficulties of proof and costs of litigating securities fraud
23 class action through trial “weigh heavily in favor of approving the Proposed
24 Settlement Agreement”). The Settlement spares the Settlement Class from the
25 substantial cost and delay associated with further litigation. *See Farrar*, 2023 WL
26 5505981, at *7 (elimination of “costs, risks, and delay strongly suggests the
27 Settlement’s adequacy”).

28

1 It is exceedingly difficult to compare the Settlement to any theoretical amount
2 that the Settlement Class could have potentially obtained from Defendants given the
3 uncertainties outlined above. “Through protracted litigation, the settlement class
4 could conceivably extract more, but at a plausible risk of getting nothing.” *In re*
5 *Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2002 WL 32627559, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2002).
6 Thus, the immediate and substantial recovery offered by the Settlement appropriately
7 accounts for the not insubstantial risk that Plaintiffs could receive much less, or
8 nothing at all, if the case continued on. Indeed, because of the inherent risk, cost, and
9 delay of successfully litigating securities class action lawsuits through trial and
10 appeal, courts regularly approve securities settlements that provide a similar, or even
11 lower, recovery. *See, e.g., Hunt v. Bloom Energy Corp.*, 2024 WL 1995840, at *6
12 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2024) (settlement for 5.2% of total damages supported final
13 approval); *Hardy v. Embark Tech., Inc.*, 2024 WL 1354416, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sep.
14 26, 2023) (same for 1% of damages); *In re Lyft Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2023 WL 5068504,
15 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2023) (same for 3.2% of damages); *Kendall*, 2022 WL
16 1997530, at *5 (same for 3.49% of damages).

17 Moreover, Owlet has experienced recurring operating losses and generated
18 negative cash flows from operations since inception and its continued litigation
19 would deplete its insurance, raising a substantial risk to collectability of any
20 judgment.

21 As such, the Settlement provides a fair and reasonable recovery at any stage
22 of the litigation, but particularly here because costs remained relatively low and
23 significant uncertainty remained on a multitude of issues yet to be litigated.

24 **Effectiveness of Proposed Method for Distributing Relief.** Rule
25 23(e)(2)(C)(ii) calls for the court to weigh to potential relief against “the
26 effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the
27 method of processing class-member claims.” This analysis requires the court to
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1 “scrutinize the method of claims processing to ensure that it facilitates filing
2 legitimate claims” without being “unduly demanding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2),
3 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendments.

4 The Court’s Preliminary Approval Order established a plan to provide notice
5 to Settlement Class Members, which Plaintiffs and the Claims Administrator duly
6 followed. As the Court directed in the Preliminary Approval Order, the Claims
7 Administrator mailed the Postcard Notice to all those who could be identified with
8 reasonable effort, supplemented by the online publication of the Summary Notice on
9 *Investor’s Business Daily* and transmission to *GlobeNewswire* on October 27, 2025.
10 Craig Decl. ¶11. The Claims Administrator estimates successful delivery of 47,307
11 out of the 47,605 notices disseminated to potential Settlement Class Members, an
12 approximately 99% success rate. *Id.* ¶¶5-10. The Postcard Notice notified Settlement
13 Class Members of the Settlement and directed them to a case-specific website where
14 the Claims Administrator posted key documents including the Stipulation, Notice,
15 Postcard Notice, joint Claim Form, Preliminary Approval Order, and Stipulation. *Id.*
16 ¶13. The website has received 4,697 pageviews from 2,199 unique users. *Id.*

17 The Notice provides all necessary information for Settlement Class Members
18 to make an informed decision regarding the proposed Settlement. It “generally
19 describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse
20 viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.” *Rodriguez*, 563 F.3d
21 at 962. The Notice gave Settlement Class Members all the necessary information
22 they needed to decide whether to opt-out, object, or file a claim. The Notice discloses,
23 among other things: (1) the amount of the Settlement; (2) why the Parties propose
24 the Settlement; (3) the estimated average recovery per damaged share; (4) the
25 maximum amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses that Lead Counsel would seek; (5)
26 Lead Counsel’s contact information; (6) that Settlement Class Members could object
27 to the Settlement or exclude themselves from the Settlement Class, and the
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1 consequences thereof; and (7) the dates and deadlines for certain Settlement-related
2 events. *See* 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(7). The Notice further explains that the Net
3 Settlement Fund would be distributed to eligible Settlement Class Members who
4 submit valid Proof of Claim forms under the Plan of Allocation as described in the
5 Notice. In sum, the Notice fairly apprises Settlement Class Members of their rights,
6 is the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and complies with the Court’s
7 Preliminary Approval Order, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the PSLRA, and
8 due process. *See, e.g., Stable Rd.*, 2024 WL 3643393, at *11 (“The Notice provides
9 all the necessary information required by Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and satisfies the
10 requirements of the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7)... As such, the notice program
11 has fairly apprised Settlement Class Members of their rights with respect to the
12 Settlement, and is the best notice practicable under the circumstances.”); *In re Portal*
13 *Software, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2007 WL 4171201, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2007)
14 (approving similar notice program).

15 These procedures are necessary insofar as neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants
16 possess the trading data necessary for a claims-free process and are regularly held to
17 be “effective” in securities class actions. *See, e.g., Baron*, 2024 WL 3504234, at *9
18 (finding nearly identical procedures “effective” for preliminary approval in securities
19 class action); *accord Farrar*, 2023 WL 5505981, at *7; *Hessefort v. Super Micro*
20 *Comput., Inc.*, 2023 WL 7185778, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2023); *Schneider*, 2023
21 WL 11944374, at *8.

22 **Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees.** Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii) requires the Court
23 to account for “the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees.” Lead Counsel is
24 applying for a fee award of one-third of the Settlement Amount. As explained more
25 fully in the accompanying motion for award of attorneys’ fees, the requested award
26 is reasonable considering the work performed and results obtained. Moreover, the
27 Settlement is not contingent on any ruling with respect to attorneys’ fees (Stip. ¶¶7.2,
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1 8.0), which further supports final approval. *See SEB Inv. Mgmt. AB v. Symantec Corp.*,
2 2022 WL 409702, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2022) (settlement raises no “red flags”
3 for purposes of Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii) when it is “not conditioned upon any award of
4 attorney’s fees”).

5 Plaintiffs also request a service award of \$13,000 (\$10,000 for Lead Plaintiff
6 Drew Conant and \$3,000 for additional Plaintiff Eric Lee). It is not uncommon for
7 courts to approve service awards to plaintiffs. *See Sypherd*, 2023 WL 1931319, at *6
8 (granting incentive awards of \$10,000 to each Named Plaintiff); *Fleming v. Impax*
9 *Lab’ys Inc.*, 2021 WL 5447008, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2021) (award of \$15,000
10 in securities case “not per se unreasonable” for preliminary approval); *Raffin v.*
11 *Medicredit, Inc.*, 2018 WL 8621204, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2018) (granting
12 \$15,000 award to representative who produced documents, sat for deposition, and
13 participated in various motion and settlement discussions); *see also Mandalevy*, 2022
14 WL 4474263, at *11 (award comprising .27% of settlement amount was reasonable).

15 **Rule 23(e) Agreements.** Finally, the court must consider “any agreement
16 required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3),” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iv), that is,
17 “any agreement made in connection with the proposal,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3). The
18 Parties have entered into a confidential agreement that establishes certain conditions
19 under which Defendants may terminate the Settlement if Settlement Class Members
20 totaling a certain percentage of the outstanding shares of Sandbridge common stock
21 as of the close of business on June 1, 2021 request exclusion (or “opt out”) from the
22 Settlement. “This type of agreement is standard in securities class action settlements
23 and has no negative impact on the fairness of the Settlement.” *Christine Asia Co. v.*
24 *Yun Ma*, 2019 WL 5257534, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2019), *appeal withdrawn sub*
25 *nom. Tan Chao v. William*, 2020 WL 763277 (2d Cir. Jan. 2, 2020). Its terms are
26 confidential “to prevent third parties from utilizing it for the improper purpose of
27 obstructing the settlement and obtaining higher payouts” for themselves at the
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1 expense of other Settlement Class members. *Farrar*, 2023 WL 5505981, at *10; *see*
2 *also In re Carrier IQ, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig.*, 2016 WL 4474366, at *5 (N.D.
3 Cal. Aug. 25, 2016) (“[O]pt-out deals are not uncommon as they are designed to
4 ensure that an objector cannot try to hijack a settlement in his or her own self-
5 interest.”), *amended on other grounds*, 2016 WL 6091521 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016).

6 **4. The Settlement Treats All Class Members Equitably**

7 Rule 23(e)(2)(D) requires courts to evaluate whether the settlement “treats class
8 members equitably relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). Such is the
9 case here. Specifically, an Authorized Claimant’s pro rata share shall be the
10 Authorized Claimant’s Recognized Claim divided by the total of Recognized Claims
11 of all Authorized Claimants, multiplied by the total amount in the Net Settlement
12 Fund. *See BofI Holding*, 2022 WL 9497235, at *7–8 (finding pro rata distribution of
13 settlement constituted equitable treatment of class members); *Christine Asia Co.*,
14 2019 WL 5257534, at *14 (pro rata distribution method of distributing relief “is
15 standard in securities and other class actions and is effective”).

16 **5. Application of the Remaining Hanlon Factors Supports** 17 **Approval**

18 Many of the *Hanlon* factors are already addressed above. Consideration of the
19 remaining *Hanlon* factors further confirms that final approval is warranted.

20 **Reaction of the Settlement Class.** The reaction of the class to the proposed
21 settlement is a “significant factor” weighing on its adequacy. *Delacruz v. CytoSport,*
22 *Inc.*, 2014 WL 12648451, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2014). Indeed, “the absence of a
23 large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong
24 presumption that the terms . . . are favorable to the class members.” *Omnivision*, 559
25 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, SCS has sent more
26 than 47,000 copies of the Postcard Notice to potential Settlement Class members or
27 nominees, with a 99% successful delivery rate. *See Craig Decl.* ¶¶5-10. The lack of
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1 objections or opt-outs with such a high notification rate, indicate a favorable
2 settlement. *Sypherd*, 2023 WL 1931319, at *4.

3 While the deadline set by the Court for Settlement Class members to lodge
4 objections (January 16, 2026) has not yet passed, the fact that there have been no
5 objections to the Settlement or requests to be excluded from the Settlement to date,
6 is strong evidence that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate, if not highly favorable.
7 *See Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop.*, 221 F.R.D. at 529 (“[t]he complete absence of
8 Class Member objections to the Proposed Settlement speaks volumes with respect to
9 the overwhelming degree of support” and “is compelling evidence that the Proposed
10 Settlement is fair, just, reasonable, and adequate”); *see also, e.g., Ali*, 2024 WL
11 5179910, at *8 (lack of objections or exclusions in securities settlement “weighs in
12 favor of settlement”); *Derr v. Ra Med. Sys., Inc.*, 2022 WL 21306534, at *5 (S.D.
13 Cal. Sep. 23, 2022) (similar); *Kendall*, 2022 WL 1997530, at *6 (similar). To the
14 extent there are any objections to the Settlement lodged after this filing, they will be
15 addressed in Plaintiffs’ reply, due January 30, 2026.

16 **Discovery Conducted to Date and Stage of Proceedings.** The focus of this
17 inquiry is whether the parties “carefully investigated the claims before reaching a
18 resolution.” *Hardy*, 2024 WL 1354416, at *5. As the Ninth Circuit has held, “formal
19 discovery is not a necessary ticket to the bargaining table” where the parties have
20 sufficient information to make an informed decision about settlement. *Linney v.*
21 *Cellular Alaska P’ship*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, “[t]he fact that
22 formal discovery was in its early stages does not weigh against final approval.” *Stable*
23 *Rd.*, 2024 WL 3643393, at *9. On the contrary, the exchange of initial information
24 can further support a finding that counsel’s assessment of the claims was “well-
25 informed.” *Id.*

26 Here, Lead Plaintiffs conducted an extensive investigation of Sandbridge and
27 Owlet, including interviewing former employees and analyzing numerous publicly
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1 available documents. Moreover, Plaintiffs engaged in substantial briefing on the
2 motion to dismiss, consulted with experts, the Parties exchanged detailed mediation
3 briefs, and participated in a mediation process in conjunction with an experienced
4 mediator. *Vaccaro v. New Source Energy Partners L.P.*, 2017 WL 6398636, at *5
5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017) (“Although the action did not proceed to formal discovery,
6 Lead Plaintiffs (i) reviewed vast amounts of publicly available information, (ii)
7 conducted interviews of numerous individuals, and (iii) consulted experts on the . . .
8 industry. The Court finds that Lead Plaintiffs were well-informed to gauge the
9 strengths and weaknesses of their claims and the adequacy of the settlement.”).

10 Indeed, Plaintiffs secured the Settlement at a uniquely advantageous stage of
11 the proceedings, having accumulated sufficient information to make an informed
12 decision but before bearing the substantial costs associated with class certification
13 and/or completing merits discovery.

14 **B. The Plan of Allocation Should Be Approved**

15 As set forth in the long-form Notice, the Net Settlement Fund will be divided
16 among Settlement Class members who submit timely and valid Claims in accordance
17 with the Plan of Allocation described therein. ECF No. 144-2, at 75-78 of 118. A
18 plan for allocating settlement proceeds, like the settlement itself, should be approved
19 if it is “fair, reasonable and adequate.” *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. A plan
20 of allocation “need not be perfect.” *Brown v. Brewer*, 2012 WL 12882380, at *1
21 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012). Rather, an allocation formula that has a “reasonable,
22 rational basis” satisfies the requirement, “particularly if recommended by competent
23 class counsel.” *Id.* Generally, a plan of allocation that reimburses class members
24 based on the extent of their injuries is reasonable. *Mauss v. NuVasive, Inc.*, 2018 WL
25 6421623, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2018).

26 As described in the Notice, the Plan of Allocation was developed with the
27 assistance of Plaintiffs’ damages expert and designed to equitably distribute the Net
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1 Settlement Fund to Authorized Claimants based on their respective economic losses
2 as a result of the alleged fraud, as opposed to market-wide factors, industry-wide
3 factors, or company-specific factors unrelated to the alleged fraud. *See* ECF No. 144-
4 2, at 76 of 118. The Net Settlement Fund will be distributed to each Authorized
5 Claimant on *pro rata* basis based on the amount of their Recognized Loss relative to
6 the total Net Settlement Fund. *Id.* If the Recognized Loss is less than \$10.00, then no
7 distribution will be made. *Id.* at 77 of 118. Courts have found nearly identical
8 allocation plans to be fair, reasonable, and adequate in other securities class action
9 settlements. *See, e.g., Ali*, 2024 WL 5179910, at *9 (collecting cases). Indeed, plans
10 of this type are “customary” and “standard” in securities class action settlements.
11 *Bernstein v. Ginkgo Bioworks Holdings, Inc.*, 2024 WL 5112227, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
12 Dec. 13, 2024). The fairness of the plan is not disturbed by the provision not to pay
13 *de minimis* claims less than \$10. Such small checks are frequently discarded by
14 recipients and “cause a disproportionate administrative expense to the fund,” and,
15 thus, other Settlement Class members. *In re MGM Mirage Sec. Litig.*, 708 F. App’x
16 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2017). For this reason, courts regularly approve plans with similar
17 minimum thresholds. *Id.*; *see also Baron*, 2024 WL 3504234, at *11; *Hefler v. Wells*
18 *Fargo & Co.*, 2018 WL 6619983, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2023), *aff’d sub nom.*
19 *Hefler v. Pekoc*, 802 F. App’x 285 (9th Cir. 2020).

20 Moreover, the lack of any objections to the Plan of Allocation after distributing
21 the Notice provides further evidence that it is fair. *See Mauss*, 2018 WL 6421623, at
22 *4.

23 **VI. CONCLUSION**

24 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant
25 the unopposed motion for final approval of the Section 14(a) class action settlement.

26 Dated: January 2, 2026

POMERANTZ LLP

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By: Tamar A. Weinrib

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